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The recent macroeconomic history of emerging market economies is coloured 
with economic crises of all kinds, ranging from debt-crises, through 
hyperinflationary periods to currency crises to name but a few.  Much of the 
empirical literature notes that alongside fast-paced structural change this has 
resulted in volatile business cycles and a difficult environment for stabilisation 
policy.  Both short-  and long-run output dynamics are shaped by the 
multidimensional exposure of EMEs to economic shocks.  The paper uses an SVAR 
analysis and finds that in spite of high degrees of output volatility, the conduct of 
stabilisation policy has sometimes been successful in dampening short-run output 
fluctuations.  However, even when stabilisation has been successful, the effect on 
overall output volatility has been negligible when compared to supply-side 
shocks.  The results show that economic crises are associated with large negative 
supply shocks which are only counteracted by stabilisation policy to a very small 
extent.  These crisis-related supply shocks, in turn, have large negative effects on 
potential GDP growth, which are only reversible when positive supply shocks 
regain lost ground.  Given the institutional origin of the economic crises, the 
paper suggests that for stabilisation policy to become more effective in lowering 
output volatility and maintaining long-term growth potential, it must be supported 
by appropriate supply-side measures which insulate EMEs against large negative 
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 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper analyses the contribution of stabilisation policy in the run-up to and in the wake of 
economic crises in a group of EMEs.  In doing so it finds that economic crises are associated 
with large negative supply shocks and that the output volatility induced by these crises are 
not fully counteracted by demand-side fiscal and monetary policy, even when the response is 
appropriately counter-cyclical.  When considering the effect of economic crises on long-run 
potential output growth, the role of stabilisation policy in regaining lost ground is similarly 
limited in size: although stimulatory fiscal and monetary policy can cushion the blow, 
deviations from long-run growth potential are only recovered by positive supply shocks.  In 
this regard the paper also finds that potential GDP growth is typically smaller after financial 
or exchange rate crises, and that it accelerates after a country manages to rid itself of 
hyperinflationary periods or an unstable political environment.  Despite the limited 
contribution of appropriate stabilisation policy to lower output volatility and crisis recovery, 
it remains important to craft the appropriate response, since pro-cyclical policy can contribute 
meaningfully to more volatility and prolonged deviations from long-run growth potential.  
The paper is structured as follows. 
 
Section 2 discusses the SVAR methodology in the context of the broader empirical business 
cycle literature and why it is appropriate in tackling the research question given the jointly 
determined nature of output and stabilisation policy.  Section 3 presents the empirical 
findings alongside a discussion of the econometric methods underlying the results – this 
serves to clarify both the sense and the limitations of the analysis.  The SVAR model with 
long-run restrictions in the tradition of Blanchard & Quah (1989) and Clarida & Gali (1994) 
lends itself to a nuanced analysis of stabilisation policy and output dynamics.  Firstly, 
innovation accounting results give a preliminary view of the cyclicality and transmission of 
fiscal and monetary policy to GDP, while, secondly, historical decomposition of GDP allows 
for a more nuanced analysis.  This method, successfully used by Fackler & McMillin (1998) 
and Du Plessis, Smit & Sturzenegger (2007), allows a study of policy cyclicality over time 
and the quantification of the importance of stabilisation policy in its contribution to output 
volatility.  The historical decomposition also yields a new estimate of potential GDP which 
allows for an analysis of the impact of economic crises on both actual and potential GDP.  
Section 4 summarizes the findings and discusses the implications for current design of 
stabilisation policy in EMEs.  The paper is accompanied by an appendix with results 1 
 
supporting the empirical usefulness of the econometric model. 
 
2.  METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE 
 
The methods used in the empirical business cycle literature for EMEs are both non-model- 
and model based.  Non-model based analyses of business cycles mostly rely on univariate 
techniques to study co-movements between different series (Du Toit, 2008).  In both the 
classical cycles tradition, and the deviation cycles tradition, developed on the basis of 
filtering techniques such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter, authors have documented various 
stylised facts about developing country and emerging market economy business cycles and 
stabilisation policy.  From the work of Agenor, McDermott & Prasad (2000), Rand & Tarp 
(2002), Kose, Prasad & Terrones (2006), Calderon & Fuentes (2006) and Du Plessis (2006), 
for example, consensus has been reached about higher overall output volatility among EMEs, 
when compared to developed economies.   
 
Authors also agree on the importance of stability for economic performance, given the 
negative links between volatility and growth: policy mistakes at the aggregate level cause 
inflation, distort labour- and capital market decisions and can either end or prolong recessions 
(Du Plessis et al., 2007); and there is a negative link between high output volatility long-term 
economic growth driven by productivity (Ramey & Ramey, 1995 and Aghion & Banerjee, 
2005).  However, there remains some disagreement about the relative importance of supply- 
and demand-side shocks as the sources of overall volatility, and also about the relative 
contributions of fiscal and monetary policy to business fluctuations.  The next section will 
investigate these short- and longer-term issues in the context of the crises experienced by 
EMEs, but using a model-based approach. 
 
Even though all structural models impose theoretical discipline on reduced-form 
characterizations of the data, empirical analyses differ according to the relative importance 
attached to theory and data while the choice of emphasis is largely determined by the goals of 
the analysis.  Growing out of a systematic critique of the systems-of-equations 
macroeconomic models built on the probabilistic foundations of Haavelmo (1944) and 
Koopmans (1949), two strands of macroeconometric modelling emerged.  Lucas (1976, 1981, 
1987) argued that variables and parameters that are endogenous with respect to policy 
regimes should be modelled explicitly in order to do policy simulations without altering the 2 
 
underlying structure of the model.  Subsequent rational expectations and real business cycle 
developments in this modelling tradition (Hansen & Sargent, 1980; Kydland & Prescott, 1982 
& 1991; Plosser, 1989), now commonly referred to as DSGE models, have been implemented 
to study EME business cycles by Aguiar & Gopinath (2004) and Neumeyer & Perri (2004), 
for instance.  These authors find that supply-side shocks are more important than demand-
side shocks in explaining output volatility among EMEs, a claim supported by the results 
presented in the next section. 
 
The alternative modelling tradition used in this paper, structural VAR models, developed out 
of by Sims’ (1980) critique of the ‘incredible’ a-priori parameter restrictions used in systems-
of-equations models, imposes theoretical discipline on reduced-form characterizations in a 
slightly different way than DSGE models.  Intuitively, the ‘structure’ of the model ensures 
that there is a unique mapping between the structural model which conforms to some 
theoretical priors about the economy itself, and the reduced-form characterization of the data.  
More formally, by restricting the cross-equation effects in the VAR system in a specific way 
we can trace out the effects of policy changes in accordance with the macroeconomic 
framework which informs the identification of the structural model.  As discussed more fully 
in the next section, this paper uses an SVAR model with long-run restrictions in the tradition 
of Blanchard & Quah (1989) and Blanchard & Fischer (1989) which decomposes output 
fluctuations into orthogonal shocks that have permanent and transitory effects on the level of 
output.  Additional restrictions necessary for model identification are imposed as done by 
Clarida and Gali (1994) and Du Plessis, Smit & Sturzenegger (2007): the demand shock is 
further decomposed into fiscal and monetary shocks. 
 
While the univariate techniques referred to above are useful for studying co-movements 
between series, they cannot control for the jointly determined nature of policy and output, and 
struggle to quantify the magnitude of the impact of stabilisation policy on business 
fluctuations.  Of course, using a SVAR model opens up new avenues of criticism (Faust & 
Leeper, 1997; Cooley & Dwyer, 1998; Gottschalk, 2001; Stock & Watson, 2001; Chari, 
Kehoe & Mcgrattan, 2005), but this paper uses the method because it is better suited to the 
jointly determined nature of business cycle policies than other methods used in the literature 
and has well-grounded theoretical economic foundations (Slutzky, 1937; Sims, 1980 & 1996; 
Shapiro & Watson, 1988; Blanchard & Fischer, 1989; Blanchard & Quah, 1989).   
Apart from this, the identification scheme allows for a clear economic interpretation of the 3 
 
structural shocks in the model. Macroeconomic analysis has reached a broad consensus 
regarding output and policy analysis summarised by Taylor, 1997: (1) long-term growth 
comes from the supply-side of the production function; (2) there is no long-term trade-off 
between inflation and unemployment, or money is neutral in the long-run; (3) there is, 
however, a short-term trade-off between inflation and unemployment, that is, money has real 
effects on output in the short-run; (4) expectations are highly responsive to policy; (5) and 
lastly, it is better to think about policy in terms of rule-like behaviour than a series of once-off 
responses.  The SVAR analysis uses these principles explicitly: principles (1) to (3) play an 
important role in the model identification and economic interpretation of the results (supply-
side and demand-side shocks), while (4) and (5) shape the policy analysis.  Lastly, the 
usefulness and validity of the identification is an empirical matter, and will be discussed 
alongside the presentation of the results and model in the next section, with reference to the 
results presented in the appendix.      
 
3.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 
This section discusses the data, empirical method and presents the findings about the business 
cycle dynamics of stabilisation policies in the group of EMEs.  To preserve the focus of the 
paper, relevant country history is introduced as the discussion develops, while references act 
as a guide to a deeper reading.   
 
3.1 DATA AND BACKGROUND 
Based on the different economic experience in terms of volatility and risk, Morgan Stanley 
Capital International (MSCI) has constructed an index of EMEs, measuring equity market 
performance.  These countries making up the index are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Korea, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Pakistan, Peru, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, 
Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey and Venezuela (www.msci.com/equity/indexdesc.html).  The 
MSCI recognises that are considered “relatively risky because they carry additional political, 
economic and currency risks”, and that these countries are structurally different (Mody, 
2004).  Selection from this group into the empirical study follows the procedure of Du Plessis 
(2006: 10) and excludes all formerly centralised economies and also those lacking sufficient 
data.  This leaves a group of six EMEs: China (Hong Kong), Israel, Korea, Mexico, Peru and 
the Philippines.   4 
 
 
The paper uses a model similar to that used by Du Plessis, Smit and Sturzenegger (2007) to 
study the South African case: for output, the model uses quarterly log real GDP in first 
difference  –  this makes up supply-side shocks.  Aggregate demand shocks are further 
decomposed into fiscal and monetary policy shocks, for which the model uses government 
expenditure as a proportion of GDP and a proxy of the real interest rate (for more detail see 
Appendix).  The expenditure-side fiscal proxy is used because, given the jointly determined 
nature of the budget balance and the economic cycle, revenue-side measures are 
inappropriate to study policy responses to the business cycle (Fatas & Mihov, 2003; Du 
Plessis, Smit & Sturzenegger, 2007).  As mentioned in Blanchard and Quah (1989), the 
identification requires a “cautious interpretation”.  Regarding the first two of the three 
restrictions, whether fiscal and monetary policies have only transitory effects on output is 
indeed an empirical issue.  Further reason for caution is the validity of the assumption that 
preferences for public goods are independent of interest cost, as required by the third 
identification restriction that monetary policy has no permanent effect on fiscal policy (Du 
Plessis et al., 2007).  There is also doubt about the stationarity of some of the series, while 
this and the afore-mentioned is properly investigated by looking at model stability.  
Parameters can, however, still be estimated consistently even if a unit root is present (Sims, 
Stock & Watson, 1990).  The results in the appendix confirm that the SVAR models are 
stable in the sense that their roots lie within the unit circle, while it also presents theory 
consistent accumulated impulse response functions.   
 
To return to the unresolved empirical issues that emerged from the brief literature review, a 
quick look at the GDP data for the 6 countries shows the large drops in aggregate economic 
activity associated with economic crises, or periods of instability (see the shaded areas on the 
graphs in Panel 1).  The latter part of this section will investigate to what extent these drops 
have permanent effects on long-run potential GDP growth, and also the ability of demand-
side policies to counteract negative effects of crises – this is especially relevant in China, 
Korea and the Philippines.  In countries like Mexico and Peru, instability at the aggregate 
level is associated with erratic demand-side policies which resulted in hyper-inflationary 
periods, where much of the Israeli instability had political origins.  Even though by looking at 
Panel 2 no single EME in this group can claim to be a model of stability on the monetary 
side, it is clear that Mexico, Peru and Israel have had periods of wild inflation and interest 
rate movements.  A corresponding change in the profile of GDP in the absence of these 5 
 
instabilities warrants a similar investigation into  the long-run impact and the short-run 
responses to periods of crisis. 
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Panel 2: Nominal Interest Rate and Inflation Rate for EMEs 
 
 
It is insightful to mention some historical developments regarding economic crises and 
stabilisation policy developments.  The Chinese (Hong Kong) economy was affected by 


































































in an environment of developing money markets, has only been active since 1998, and fiscal 
policy is actively used as an expansionary tool (Ruogu, 2003; Green, 2005; Dullien, 2006).  
Israel experienced a stock market crash in 1983 in the midst of problematic fiscal policy, 
while recent fiscal policy reforms aim at rolling back the state.  Regarding monetary policy, 
central bank reform towards the pursuit of long-term price stability started in the early 1980s, 
with the adoption of inflation targeting type policies since 1992 (Strawczynski & Zeira, 2007; 
Debrun, Epstein & Symansky, 2008).   
 
Korea was deeply affected by the 1997/1998 Asian crisis, and subsequently revised the credit 
system, and ever since has been pursuing a managed float with inflation targeting type 
monetary policy (Eichengreen, 2004; Lee, Rhee & Sung, 2006).  Mexico experienced hyper 
inflations and was severely affected by currency devaluation in 1994, and has since been 
operating independent monetary policy under a floating exchange rate (Carstens & Werner, 
1999).  Peru had a hyper-inflationary period from 1980 until 1990, after which currency 
reform in 1991 led to monetary policy with money-base control, and since 2002 this has 
changed to an inflation target type regime (Armas, 2003).  The Philippine economy was also 
affected by the  1997/1998 Asian crisis, while fiscal problems during the 1980s were 
associated with a large scale debt crisis.  Also, while operating under money-targeting 
monetary policy until 1990, gradual reform in the direction of inflation targeting has been 
implemented since 2002 (Lim, 2007).  With these facts in mind, we can proceed with the 
econometric analysis.  
 
3.2 ECONOMETRIC MODEL 
 
This section, presenting the econometric model, is intended to show how the structural VAR 
is recovered from the reduced form VAR using the identifying restrictions.  Although some 
of these details are adequately discussed by Blanchard & Quah (1989), Clarida & Gali (1994) 
and Du Plessis, Smit and Sturzenegger (2007), this section presents the analytical setup of the 
model setup for the sake of continuity and discusses the algebraic and econometric detail for 
the sake of clarity.  It will become clear how assumptions about the aggregate economy 
translate into econometric restrictions on the model, and how this allows us to study the 




3.2.1 MODEL SETUP 
We start with a three-variable Structural VAR model, with a 3 x 1 column vector 
T for the variables, and a 3 x 1 column vector  
T for the 
structural shocks associated with the variables.  The moving average representation of the 
model is given in (3.1),   
 
  ,           (3.1) 
 
where   defines the contemporaneous structural relationship between the shocks and the 
variables,   the lagged relationship and so forth.  The reduced form model is given in (3.2), 
 
    ,        .      (3.2) 
 
Because the structural model is unobservable, we estimate the reduced form model in (3.2).  
When estimating (3.2) the structural moving average the model is not directly recovered from 
the data, but rather recovered by estimating a VAR with reduced form shocks   as in (3.2).  
The Blanchard-Quah approach to identification implies that we do not have to make strong 
assumptions about the model dynamics.  Instead, we recover the Structural VAR and its 
structural matrices   by imposing long-run restrictions on the variance-covariance matrix of 
(3.2).  To this end, we assume there exists some non-singular matrix   such that  , 
which maps the DGP into the model.  From (3.1) and (3.2), it is clear that 
 and   in general, where   is the lag operator.  By substituting the 
result into (3.1) it follows that  
 
  .                   (3.3)   
 
We recover the reduced form shocks by our estimation of (3.2) and also an estimate of the 
symmetric variance-covariance matrix of the shocks in (3.2): 
 
  .                  (3.4)  
 
Because the reduced form VAR in (3.2) is under-identified, it is impossible to recover   and 
 without additional restrictions.  If we assume that the shocks are orthogonal to each other 9 
 
and have a unit variance, with no loss of generality, then by substituting (3.3) into (3.4) and 
solving for the expectation,  , and finally 
 
  .                   (3.5)   
 
The variance-covariance matrix in (3.5) is a system of 9 equations in 6 unknowns.  So we 
need 3 additional restrictions for the system to be just-identified.  Only then can we identify 
, the structural shocks   and the system dynamics  .  
   
3.2.2 IDENTIFICATION 
The Blanchard-Quah long-run restriction is that the demand shock does not affect output in 
the long run.  This is consistent with the principles mentioned by Taylor (1997).  The 3 
additional restrictions required for identification (Du Plessis, Smit & Sturzenegger, 2007; 
Clarida & Gali, 1994) are represented as follows.   Letting   the 
restriction that neither fiscal nor monetary policy, the components of aggregate demand, have 
a long run effect on output is given by, 
 
  .               (3.6)  
 
To complete the identification, the long-run effect of monetary policy on the fiscal policy 
stance is restricted to zero such that, 
 
  .                   (3.7) 
 
The additional restrictions (3.6) and (3.7) yield a lower triangle matrix  , 
 
  .           (3.8)  
   
Now, letting   and so forth, then the reduced form VAR in 
(3.2) can be written as, 
 
  .           (3.9)  10 
 
Since  , we can obtain the matrix (3.10) and see that by 
substituting (3.5) into (3.10) we get the equivalent expression in (3.11) in terms of the 
restricted matrix   from the structural model.  We now have,   
 
                    (3.10)  
and, 
   ,               (3.11)  
 
which can be computed from the estimates of   and  .  Now if   is the unique lower 
triangle Choleski decomposition of  , then   and by the definition of 
, then 
 
  .                 (3.12) 
 
From the result in (12) we see that the restricted lower triangle matrix   identifies the 
structural matrix    via our estimates obtained in the reduced form VAR.  Practically 
speaking, we estimate the reduced form VAR in (3.2), calculate  , compute the lower 
triangle Choleski matrix   and  , then get an estimate of   from the 
relation in (3.12).  From this procedure we get the contemporaneous structural relationship, 
the system dynamics and the shocks in the system.  This will allow for explicit study of the 
cyclicality of fiscal and monetary policy.  All SVARs include 4 lags. 
 
3.3 INNOVATION ACCOUNTING 
Apart from providing support for the empirical usefulness of the identification scheme 
discussed in the previous section, the innovation accounting also gives a suggestive look at 
the response of variables to different shocks in the VAR system.  In keeping with the issues 
addressed in this paper, the innovation accounting is used to gauge the cyclicality and 
transmission of fiscal and monetary policy.  In the notation introduced above, the IRF is 
made up of the effects of the impact multipliers   via the structural shocks   - these impact 
multipliers contain contemporaneous and cumulative effects of the shocks on the variables or 
short- and long-term effects.   An appropriate summation of the effects yields the cumulative 
effect after n periods, 
 11 
 
                    (3.13) 
 
where i is the number of periods,   and  , the rows and columns of the   
matrix, and where   is finite because the variables in the system are stationary 
(Enders, 2004).  The meaning of the long-run restrictions discussed in the previous section 
are immediately clear – when the cumulative effect of monetary and fiscal policy on output is 
restricted to zero in the long-run, as well as the effect of monetary policy on fiscal policy, we 
expect to see the restriction when we study the IRFs of the respective structural shocks.  In 
this way, IRF analysis allows a consistency and stability check on model identification, to see 
whether the actual model for the given data set corresponds to our priors about the structure 
of the economy.  Graphically, we see the IRF by plotting   against i, which is a visual 
representation of the behaviour of the given series in   in response to the structural shock  .   
We can also learn about the importance of the sources of these fluctuations by studying the 
relative contributions of each shock to the variation of the forecast errors of the variables in 
the system – this is the essence of variance decomposition.  Formally, for any n-period ahead 
forecast, the forecast error is given by, 
 
  .            (3.14)  
 
For the same forecast, the forecast error variance, denoted as  , is given by, 
 
        (3.15)  
 
where i is the number of lags in the model.  From (3.15) we get the variance decomposition 
by simply dividing both sides by the forecast error variance, in which case they simply sum 
to 100, when expressed in terms of percentages.  In this application we can gauge the relative 
importance of monetary and fiscal policy in contributing to variation in output.   
 
3.3.1 RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the findings about the cyclicality, coordination and transmission of fiscal 
and monetary policy, based on the innovation accounting.  Worrisome pro-cyclical fiscal 
policy is identified in Peru and the Philippines while pro-cyclical monetary policy is observed 
for China and Israel.  Otherwise fiscal and monetary policies have been mostly anti- or a-12 
 
cyclical, while coordination varies from country to country.  Variance decompositions 
suggest that the pro-cyclical policies have been quite aggressive which could add to, rather 
than subtract from output volatility.  In China, Israel and Peru, monetary policy has a larger 
share in its contribution to the variability of output, whereas fiscal policy’s contribution is 
larger for Korea, Mexico and the Philippines.  Of course, these results are for the whole 
sample period, and the advantage of the historical decomposition is that we can observe the 
changes in policy behaviour over time to get a more nuanced picture.  The next section delves 










3.4 HISTORICAL DECOMPOSITION 
 
Historical decomposition allows us to decompose the data, each variable in the system, into 
the sum of the accumulated shocks and a base projection - a type of in-sample forecast 
excluding all information contained in the shocks.  From this we construct a new aggregate 
supply and demand series, which gives us a new measure of potential output. To see this from 
another perspective, following Fackler and McMillin (1998: 650), we can  look at the 
technique algebraically.  The structural model (3.1) can also be written as (3.16) 
 
            (3.16)  
 
Where   are structural coefficients and   are structural shocks, the latter forming the basis 
of the moving average representation in (3.1).  Reduced-form shocks are given by 
.  If the reduced-form coefficient matrices are denoted as  , then 
, and the moving average matrix is given by  .   
   
Table 1: Innovation Accounting Results on Stabilisation Policy 
     Cyclicality  Coordination  Transmission 
Country  Fiscal  Monetary  Fiscal  Monetary  Fiscal  Monetary 
China  anti/a  pro  accom  counter  1.5  4.0 
Israel  anti/a  pro  counter  counter  4.9  6.3 
Korea  anti/a  anti/a  counter  accom  16.8  1.0 
Mexico  anti/a  anti  a  counter  23.9  1.3 
Peru  pro  anti  accom  counter  2.8  17.1 
Philippines  pro  anti  counter/a  a  38.8  1.2 13 
 
This leads to the familiar moving average representation for the reduced-form VAR given in 
(3.2),  
 
  .          (3.17)   
 
Now, when the reduced-form VAR is rewritten in structural terms, the historical composition 
of the data becomes clear.  The structural version of (3.17) is given purely by substitution as, 
 
  ,                 (3.18) 
   
        ,          (3.19)  
   
  .                (3.20)  
 
For a given period   the structural representation of   can be written as, 
 
  ,          (3.21)   
 
which is the historical decomposition of the observed data.  To make (3.21) easier to 
interpret, consider the case where  , 
 
  .              (3.22) 
 
The actual data at time    is the sum of the weighted mutually orthogonal structural 
shocks, summed over the period, plus the base projection of the data, conditional on the 
information available at time  .   
 
3.4.1 RESULTS 
Panel 3 shows the resulting decomposition of GDP into different cumulative supply and 
policy shocks, without the base projection.  To complete the analysis of the cyclicality of 
stabilisation policy, we can determine whether demand-side shocks are correlated with 
supply-side shocks at business cycle frequencies, by using the historical decomposition. 
 14 
 














































































Table 2 shows the correlation of fiscal and monetary shocks with supply-shocks over 
different sample periods.  
 
Table 2: Correlations Between Shocks: the Cyclicality of Stabilisation Policy 
  CHINA  Fiscal Shock  Monetary Shock  Intra-policy 
1981q1-2008q4  -0.72  0.37  -0.61 
1981q1-1990q1  -0.68  -0.81  0.45 
1990q1-2000q1  -0.57  -0.77  0.74 
2000q1-2008q4  -0.77  0.09  -0.40 
ISRAEL    
 
  
1982q1-2008q4  -0.44  0.18  -0.49 
1982q1-1990q1  0.43  -0.15  0.002 
1990q1-2000q1  -0.70  0.63  -0.77 
2000q1-2008q4  0.23  -0.13  -0.39 
KOREA          
1971q1-2008q4  0.29  -0.20  0.18 
1971q1-1980q1  0.18  -0.39  -0.34 
1980q1-1990q1  0.86  0.16  -0.18 
1990q1-2000q1  -0.68  -0.60  0.19 
2000q1-2008q4  -0.43  -0.77  0.48 
MEXICO          
1981q1-2008q4  -0.28  -0.25  0.45 
1980q1-1990q1  0.23  0.14  -0.26 
1990q1-2000q1  -0.05  -0.60  0.52 
2000q1-2008q4  -0.85  -0.27  0.57 
PERU          
1979q1-2008q1  -0.47  -0.09  -0.07 
1979q1-1994q4  -0.56  -0.10  0.00 
1994q1-2008q4  -0.36  0.19  -0.48 
PHILIPPINES          
1980q1-2008q1  -0.62  -0.16  -0.09 
1980q1-1990q1  0.90  0.27  -0.01 
1990q1-2000q1  -0.86  0.23  -0.67 
2000q1-2008q1  -0.99  -0.80  0.76 
 
 
For China, fiscal policy has been counter-cyclical over the whole sample, while monetary 
policy turned pro-cyclical only over the last 10 years.  Israeli fiscal and monetary policy has 
been pro- and anti- in turn, while Korean stabilisation policies show similar variation in its 
stance with improved cyclical conduct for the past two decades.  Mexican stabilisation policy 
also shows improvement in its cyclical stance after the crisis-years before 1995.    Peruvian 
fiscal policy has been consistently anti-cyclical while monetary policy has been both mildly 16 
 
anti- and pro-cyclical in turn.  Lastly, fiscal policy in the Philippine economy has been either 
largely pro-cyclical or largely anti-cyclical, while monetary policy, after being pro-cyclical in 
the 1980s and the 1990s, turned anti-cyclical after 2000.  Given the variation in policy 
behaviour over the sample period, and in order to study the extent of policy stabilisation in 
view of crisis events, we can do two things using the historical decomposition: firstly, form 
an expectation about the likely impact of fiscal and monetary policy on output volatility when 
compared to crisis-related shocks, and secondly do a counterfactual thought experiment in 
which we construct alternative GDP series which allow for the quantification of the 
contribution of fiscal and monetary shocks to output volatility.  In this way the historical 
decomposition sheds light on the sources of volatility and on policy behaviour in the run up 
to, and the follow up after economic crises. 
 
Table 3 shows that accumulated supply shocks are up to 8 times larger than accumulated 
demand shocks, in terms of standard deviations.  Table 4 shows that fiscal shocks to GDP 
have been larger in all EMEs in the group except for Korea and Peru.  Panels 4 and 5 
represent the findings of these tables graphically: casual visual inspection of supply- and 
demand-shocks show that the culprit driving high EME output volatility is most likely to be 
supply-side shocks, although stabilisation policy may still make a difference.   
 
Table 3: Relative Size of Aggregate Shocks 
      Country  AS  AD  Factor 
China  0.09  0.01  6.57 
Israel  0.04  0.01  7.73 
Korea  0.08  0.02  4.09 
Mexico  0.05  0.02  3.12 
Peru  0.13  0.03  5.29 
Philippines  0.08  0.07  1.12 
 
Table 4: Relative Size of Policy Shocks 
    Country  Fiscal  Monetary  Factor 
China  0.02  0.01  1.80 
Israel  0.006  0.003  1.75 
Korea  0.0132  0.0133  0.99 
Mexico  0.013  0.003  4.07 
Peru  0.014  0.022  0.66 
























































































































































To conclude the analysis of the contribution of fiscal and monetary policy to output volatility, 
Table 5 presents the findings of the following counterfactual thought experiment: by how 
much would output have been more or less stable without policy shocks, both fiscal and 
monetary together, and without either?  To get an answer we measure the standard deviation 
of GDP comparing it to what it would have been without various shocks. 
 
Table 5: Counterfactual GDP Series and Volatility 
     Actual  No shocks  No fiscal shocks  No monetary shocks 
CHINA             
Std Dev  0.339  0.334  0.327  0.346 
% change     -1%  -4%  2% 
ISRAEL             
Std Dev  0.321  0.325  0.327  0.319 
% change     1%  2%  0% 
KOREA             
Std Dev  0.722  0.706  0.711  0.717 
% change     -2%  -2%  -1% 
MEXICO             
Std Dev  0.212  0.210  0.211  0.212 
% change     -1%  -1%  0% 
PERU    
 
     
Std Dev  0.229  0.231  0.233  0.227 
% change     1%  2%  -1% 
PHILIPPINES             
Std Dev  0.263  0.216  0.215  0.264 
% change     -18%  -18%  0% 
 
With the exception of Israel and Peru, stabilisation policy has managed to increase output 
volatility from the miniscule amount of 1% in China and Mexico, or 2% in Korea, up to a 
massive 18% in the Philippines.  In China, fiscal policy destabilised output by 4% while 
monetary policy stabilised by 2%.  In Israel, fiscal policy managed to stabilise as a whole, 
while monetary policy has been neutral.  Korean policies have been slightly negative, adding 
2% and 1% from the fiscal and monetary sides respectively.  Mexican monetary shocks have 
been neutral, but fiscal shocks added 1% volatility.  Peruvian stabilisation was successful 
from the fiscal side with a 2% gain, but lost out on the monetary side with a 1% loss.  In all of 
the above cases, the aggravated or dampened volatility has been negligible, but despite, on 
the whole, neutral monetary shocks in the Philippines, fiscal shocks managed to increase 
output volatility by 18%.  Getting it wrong can indeed make a difference to volatility, but 
given the massive size of supply shocks when compared to demand shocks, it is not 20 
 
surprising that stabilisation policy could have done very little to counteract the crisis-related 
shocks experienced in these EMEs.  It is also no surprise that both potential and actual GDP 
take a substantial knock in crisis times (see Panel 6 below).  These crisis-related drops, in 
turn, are associated with large negative supply shocks (see Panel 7). 
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China, Korea and the Philippines experienced financial crises, while the Israeli political 
Intifada hit the economy alongside the dot-com bust in 2001.  Mexico and Peru, on the other 
hand experienced crises-times with irresponsible inflationary policies and currency problems 
which led to prolonged periods of crises.  One set of crises is short, sharp and deep, while the 
other is more protracted.  The former is likely to negatively impact on potential GDP growth, 
while the latter is more in line with the lifting of a constraint on economic activity, rather than 
a massive shock to already existing production processes.  We can use the new measure of 
potential GDP growth, as estimated but the SVAR model, to have a look at the range of 
effects that economic crises have had on the long-term dynamism of these EMEs: to what 
extent does the crisis affect long-run growth potential?  Panel 8, showing that potential GDP 
growth moves tightly with supply shocks, hints that sustaining long-run growth potential 
relies on maintaining positive supply shocks in the wake of, and during economic crises.  The 
results from the analysis of stabilisation policy also suggest that fiscal and monetary 
stabilisation can do little to cover ground lost on the supply side, although it can certainly 
make things worse if handled inappropriately. 
 
Table 6: Potential GDP growth and Crises 
               Overall  sd  Time  Type  Before  sd  After  sd  Factor 
China  5.28  4.74  1997q1  Financial  6.19  4.75  4.24  4.51  1.95 
Israel  4.33  3.1  2000q1  Political  4.67  2.91  3.85  3.45  0.82 
Korea  6.75  3.98  1997q1  Financial  7.97  3.14  4.2  4.3  3.77 
Mexico  2.72  3.24  1995q4  Inflation  1.41  3.19  3.8  2.9  -2.39 
Peru  2.96  7.3  1995q1  Inflation  1.14  9.58  4.93  2.9  -3.79 
Philippines  2.93  3.95  2000q1  Financial  1.21  3.6  6.09  2.03  -4.88 
 
Table 6 presents the average potential GDP growth calculated from the SVAR estimate of 
potential GDP (that is, GDP unconstrained by demand), for periods before and after sudden 
crises, and for periods during and after prolonged crises.  The results suggest that economic 
crises have a strong negative effect on potential GDP growth: EMEs that experienced 
financial crises, directly or indirectly, have potential GDP growth rates up to 3 percentage 
points lower than before the crisis, whereas EMEs that managed to rid themselves of hyper-
inflationary and political crises gain up to 4 percentage points of potential GDP growth.  Not 
only do crisis-induced supply shocks dominate the sources of output volatility in EMEs, but 
they also damage potential GDP growth to a meaningful extent; damage which, apart from an 
important supportive role played by fiscal and monetary stabilisation, is only fully reversible 
if supported by a supply-side recovery. 23 
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4.  IMPLICATIONS 
 
Reinhart & Rogoff (2008) find that serial default is “a nearly universal phenomenon as 
countries struggle to transform themselves from emerging markets to advanced economies” 
and that many other crises like inflation, exchange rate crises, banking crises and currency 
debasements, accompany these periods of default.  Crises, as demonstrated since October 
2008, often transmit from financial centres to more peripheral markets, and this has often 
been the case in EMEs.  The economic crises experienced by these EMEs are, therefore, 
hardly unique.  The analysis has shown that these crises are the main sources of output 
volatility and the demand-side stabilisation policy can play a limited but nonetheless 
important role in dampening or worsening fluctuations.  The previous section also showed 
that when supply shocks continue to be negative in the wake of a sudden deep crisis, as for 
China, Israel and Korea, potential GDP growth does not recover until the supply shocks are 
reversed.  When EMEs manage to rid themselves of prolonged inflationary and debt crises, as 
for Mexico, Peru and the Philippines, potential GDP growth picks up speed as supported by 
supply-side shocks.  The crises typically make a 3% difference to potential GDP growth 
according to the SVAR analysis, which is roughly in line with the findings of Furceri & 
Mourourgane (2009). 
 
Furcerci & Mourougane (2009) find that financial crises lower potential GDP growth for 
OECD countries from 1.5% to 2.4% on average, and that the effect takes 4 years to work 
through completely.  This, and the findings of the previous section, takes the paper to the 
heart of the issue raised by Ramey & Ramey (1995) and Aghion & Banerjee (2005): the 
negative link between volatility and long-term growth.  Of course, the actual content of the 
event that translates into the so-called volatility matters a great deal.  Financial crises affect 
potential GDP growth through direct and indirect effects, such as (Furcerci & Mourougane, 
2009): lower incentives to invest by increasing uncertainty and risk premia and increasing the 
cost of finance; prolonged and increased unemployment; a priori uncertain effects on total 
factor productivity; spiral into bad stabilisation policy, and so forth.  Apart from the more 
direct negative links, the indirect link between the onset of crises and stabilisation policy 
responses is particularly important in this context.   
 
The variables used to proxy for fiscal and monetary policy have excluded many important 
dimensions of actual stabilisation policy, such as whether the fiscal stimulus is financed by 25 
 
unsustainable debt run-up, or whether that debt is monetised, or whether interest rate 
movements weaken the balance of payments, leading to depreciations, devaluations and 
subsequent drops in real economic activity, for instance.  In other words, although the 
identification scheme imposes the long-run restriction that demand shocks do not have 
permanent effects on the level of output, it is only approximately correct to do so.  It is also 
not the case that there are no short-run feedbacks between aggregate demand and aggregate 
supply shocks.  As the SVAR analysis has shown, getting stabilisation wrong in cyclical 
terms can add a substantial amount of volatility to output, and in the absence of a recovery on 
the supply side of the economy, appropriate demand-side measures can make an important 
difference by adding stability, and counteracting the negative effects of economic crises.  The 
quantitative answers of this analysis, however, suggest that such stabilisation should be done 
in conjunction with supportive supply-side policy measures (institutional for instance) to be 
effective.   
 
5.  CONCLUSION 
 
The paper used an SVAR model with long-run restrictions to study the dynamics of fiscal and 
monetary stabilisation policy in a group of EMEs.  These dynamics have been characterised 
by responses to the phases of the business cycle and to economic crises.  Results suggest that 
the main source of volatility in output is supply-side shocks, and that where stabilisation 
policy has been conducted appropriately, the stabilising effect has been quite small.  When, 
however, policies have been pro-cyclical, volatility has seen quite dramatic increases.  Apart 
from analysing these short-run policy responses and output fluctuations, the paper also 
looked at the long-run implications of economic crises for potential GDP growth and the role 
of stabilisation policy in supporting recoveries.  Based on the SVAR estimates of potential 
GDP, and the identification of aggregate shocks, the paper shows that economic crises are 
associated with large negative supply shocks and that experiencing economic crises lower 
potential GDP growth by about 3%.  This is only fully recovered once supply shocks become 
supportive, which means that stabilisation policy has a limited though important temporary 
role in cushioning the blow dealt by economic crises.  For demand-side policies to become 
more effective, and for EMEs to lower volatility, it is necessary to institutionally support the 
supply side of the economy in ways that insulate against the adverse effects of economic 
crises and the associated negative impacts on real economic activity.  This message is 
especially relevant in the context of the present global financial crisis and recession.   26 
 
APPENDIX 
Table A1: Data Sources 
          Country  Source  GDP  GDP Deflator  Gov Cons   Interest Rate  Consumer Prices 
China (HK)  IFS/IMF   53299B..ZF...  53299BIPZF...  53291F..ZF...  Censtadt*  53264...ZF... 
Israel  IFS/IMF**  43699B..ZF...  43699BIPZF...  43691F..ZF...  43660P..ZF...  43664...ZF... 
Korea  IFS/IMF  54299B..ZF...  54299BIPZF...  54291F..ZF...  54260...ZF...  54264...ZF... 
Mexico  IFS/IMF  27399B.CZF...  27399BIRZF...  27391F.CZF...  27360L..ZF...  27364...ZF... 
Peru  IFS/IMF  29399B..ZF...  29399BIPZF...  29391F..ZF...  29360...ZF...  29364...ZF... 
Philippines  IFS/IMF  56699B..ZF...  56699BIPZF...  56691F..ZF...  56660C..ZF...  56664...ZF... 
*www.info.gov.hk/censtadt/eng/hkstat/ 
        **www.imfstatistics.org 
           
Panel A1: China Input Series 
 
 
Panel A2: Israel Input Series  
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Panel A4: Mexico Input Series 
 
 
Panel A5: Peru Input Series 
 
 
Panel A6: Philippines Input Series 
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Panel A7: China Accumulated Impulse Response Functions 
 
 
Panel A8: Israel Accumulated Impulse Response Functions 
 
 
Panel A9: Korea Accumulated Impulse Response Functions 
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Panel A10: Mexico Accumulated Impulse Response Functions 
 
 
Panel A11: Peru Accumulated Impulse Response Functions 
 
 
Panel A12: Philippines Accumulated Impulse Response Functions 
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Panel A13: China IRFs 
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Panel A15: Korea IRFs 
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Panel A18: Philippines IRFs 
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The results below present Ng & Perron (1996, 2001) unit root tests.  MZa and MZt are 
interpreted like usual test statistics (a test statistic larger than the critical value rejects the null 
hypothesis), whereas for MSB and MPT a value less than the critical value rejects the null 
hypothesis. 
  
Table A2: China Unit Root Tests 
                   MZa     MZt     MSB     MPT 
Null Hypothesis: YDIFF has a unit root    
 
     
Ng-Perron test statistics     0.08952  0.06725  0.75124  35.2915 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 
   10%  -5.7  -1.62  0.275  4.45 
Null Hypothesis: GCONSGDP has a unit root    
 
     
Ng-Perron test statistics     -2.70819  -1.11601  0.41208  8.87742 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 
   10%  -5.7  -1.62  0.275  4.45 
Null Hypothesis: RLENDING has a unit root             
Ng-Perron test statistics 
 
-6.17712  -1.66353  0.26931  4.27503 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 





          Table A3: Israel Unit Root Tests 
                   MZa     MZt     MSB     MPT 
Null Hypothesis: YDIFF has a unit root    
 
     
Ng-Perron test statistics     0.21463  0.18678  0.87023  46.3002 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 
   10%  -5.7  -1.62  0.275  4.45 
Null Hypothesis: GCONSGDP has a unit root             
Ng-Perron test statistics 
 
-0.76178  -0.39392  0.51711  17.2138 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 
   10%  -5.7  -1.62  0.275  4.45 
Null Hypothesis: RDISCOUNT has a unit root    
 
     
Ng-Perron test statistics     -21.0283  -3.24208  0.15418  1.16679 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 
   10%  -5.7  -1.62  0.275  4.45 
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Table A4: Korea Unit Root Tests 
                   MZa     MZt     MSB     MPT 
Null Hypothesis: YDIFF has a unit root    
 
     
Ng-Perron test statistics     0.52456  1.33718  2.54913  372.764 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 
   10%  -5.7  -1.62  0.275  4.45 
Null Hypothesis: GCONSGDP has a unit root             
Ng-Perron test statistics 
 
-1.00537  -0.33468  0.33289  10.8342 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 
   10%  -5.7  -1.62  0.275  4.45 
Null Hypothesis: RDISCOUNT has a unit root    
 
     
Ng-Perron test statistics     -4.24995  -1.36985  0.32232  5.90382 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 





          Table A5: Mexico Unit Root Tests 
                 MZa     MZt     MSB     MPT 
Null Hypothesis: YDIFF has a unit root    
 
     
Ng-Perron test statistics     -0.40356  -0.29732  0.73674  30.4934 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 
   10%  -5.7  -1.62  0.275  4.45 
Null Hypothesis: GCONSGDP has a unit root             
Ng-Perron test statistics 
 
-3.74731  -1.3013  0.34726  6.5764 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 
   10%  -5.7  -1.62  0.275  4.45 
Null Hypothesis: RDEPOSIT has a unit root    
 
     
Ng-Perron test statistics     -11.826  -2.43144  0.2056  2.07263 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 
   10%  -5.7  -1.62  0.275  4.45 
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Table A6: Peru Unit Root Tests 
                   MZa     MZt     MSB     MPT 
Null Hypothesis: YDIFF1 has a unit root    
 
     
Ng-Perron test statistics     -8.20876  -2.00325  0.24404  3.0727 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 
   10%  -5.7  -1.62  0.275  4.45 
Null Hypothesis: GCONSGDP has a unit root             
Ng-Perron test statistics 
 
-2.5975  -1.10632  0.42592  9.2887 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 
   10%  -5.7  -1.62  0.275  4.45 
Null Hypothesis: RDISCOUNT has a unit root    
 
     
Ng-Perron test statistics     -11.1958  -2.36564  0.2113  2.18973 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 





          Table A7: Philippines Unit Root Tests 
                 MZa     MZt     MSB     MPT 
Null Hypothesis: YDIFF2 has a unit root    
 
     
Ng-Perron test statistics     -9.15939  -2.13741  0.23336  2.68525 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 
   10%  -5.7  -1.62  0.275  4.45 
Null Hypothesis: GCONSGDP has a unit root             
Ng-Perron test statistics 
 
-1.55239  -0.87284  0.56226  15.6187 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 
   10%  -5.7  -1.62  0.275  4.45 
Null Hypothesis: RDEPOSIT has a unit root    
 
     
Ng-Perron test statistics     -12.8518  -2.50571  0.19497  2.02165 
Asymptotic critical values*:  1%  -13.8  -2.58  0.174  1.78 
   10%  -5.7  -1.62  0.275  4.45 
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